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Abstract 
 
The paper studies the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic 
growth when sufficient provisions of infrastructure is a pre-requisite. In the overlap- 
ping generations structure setting, we show that technology spillovers via FDI take 
place only when the host country has the sufficient level of infrastructure. Infras- 
tructure has a subsequent positive feedback on further investment which leads the 
country grow faster. If infrastructure falls short of the critical level, however, then 
FDI has little effect on growth as the country is trapped in a low-growth equilibrium. 
We also present the simulations and empirical results based on panel data for 42 
developing countries between 1970 and 2000. They provide support to the model 
that FDI and infrastructure are complements in affecting per capita GDP growth. 
 
 
Keywords:  foreign direct investment; economic growth, technology diffusion, 
infrastructure 
 
JEL Codes:  F21, O40, O33, H54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* E-mail: ykinoshita@imf.org 
 
† E-mail: clu@econ.sinica.edu.tw 
 1 Introduction
Acquiring advanced technology and superior managerial know-how embodied in
foreign direct investment is one of the most important reasons why countries o®er
various incentives to woo the establishment of subsidiaries of multinational ¯rms
in its territory. Empirical evidence supporting this argument, however, is far from
being settled.1 Many argue that the lack of consensus on positive spillovers from
FDI is due to the di®erences in the host country's absorptive capacity such as human
capital, ¯nancial market development, trade openness and institutional quality: the
positive e®ects of FDI can be found only when it is conditioned on the recipient's
absorptive capacity.
In this paper, we identify su±cient infrastructure as the host country's absorptive
capacity. We argue that good infrastructure is not only the driver of FDI in°ows but
also a pre-requisite for positive spillovers from FDI on the host country economy. We
present a overlapping generation model in which the degree of technology spillovers
is determined by FDI in°ows to the host country and a technology gap from the
leading country, conditional on the country's infrastructure level. If it falls short of a
threshold, the country stagnates even when there are a room for technology catch-up
and there are some FDI in°ows. On the other hand, if the country's infrastructure
is su±ciently large, the country will bene¯t spillovers from FDI and attain the
higher level of growth. As a consequence, the country is able to invest more in
infrastructure that further attracts more FDI and leads to even faster growth.
Su±cient provisions of infrastructure can help attract FDI as it improves the
investment climate in developing countries by lowering the cost of foreign invest-
ment and raising the rate of return. Infrastructure is, among other attributes such
as market size, labor costs, and political and social stability, one of the main factors
that in°uence FDI decisions in emerging markets. For instance, perceived weak
infrastructure in India is often cited as a reason why investors are turning towards
other investment destinations.2 Being aware of infrastructure bottleneck for further
1For example, ¯rm-level studies by Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Haddad and Harrison (1993) ¯nd
no evidence of positive spillovers from FDI to local ¯rms.
2AT Kerney's survey on the FDI con¯dence index shows that India is lagging behind in infrastructure
2development, India has recently announced its plan to set up a $5-billion infras-
tructure development fund to facilitate the establishment of large special economic
zones (SEZs) in Mumbai.3 Also, in China, inland province such as Sichuan has been
spending heavily on bridges, expressways, and power plants in order to replicate the
development success led by foreign investment in coastal provinces. Due to a short-
ening of transit time after the opening of a new road, Sichuan province pulled in
more than $6 billion of FDI and grew by 12.7 percent in 2005.4
Figure 1 presents a casual observation on the complementarity between FDI and
infrastructure. The ¯gures are computed from the data on forty-two developing
countries between 1970 and 2000. Each bar represents the average per capita GDP
growth rate in each of the nine groups according to the ratio of FDI to GDP and
the level of infrastructure, where infrastructure is measured by the number of main
telephone lines in a country (Barro, 1989)5. Given the level of infrastructure - low,
medium, and high{, we observe that the higher is per capita GDP growth rate on
average, the more FDI the country receives. This tendency is the most obvious
where the level of infrastructure is high.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the
literature and Section 3 presents a overlapping generation model to explain the
mechanism through which infrastructure and FDI interact with the extent of tech-
nology spillovers, being followed by numerical simulations of the model in Section
4. Section 5 provides the empirical analysis using the panel data on forty-two de-
veloping countries between 1970 and 2000. Section 6 concludes the paper.
in a group of large emerging countries (Brazil, China, Mexico, and Poland). (ATKerney, FDI Con¯dence
Index, Sept 2003, Volume 6).
3The Hindu \Poor Infrastructure a major hurdle: U.S. CEOs" (June 2, 2006). Hulten and others
(2003) ¯nd that there are indeed signi¯cant and positive infrastructure externalities in India.
4Dexter Roberts, \Go West, Westerners" (Business Week, November 13, 2005).
5Infrastructure is also measured by the length of roads and power generations, which show qualitatively
similar results.
32 Brief Overview of the Literature
The role of FDI as a carrier of foreign technology had been long recognized in the
theoretical literature. A pioneering work by Findlay (1978) develops a theoretical
framework and hypothesizes that the rate of technology transfer from FDI is posi-
tively related to technology gap between the host country and the source country.
In this model, technology spillover inevitably happens as long as the host country's
technology level is relatively behind that of the source country. In other words, there
is no room for the host country's absorptive capacity to play a role in a®ecting the
extent of technology spillovers.
The empirical evidence for technology spillover from multinational to domestic
¯rms, however, is still divided. At the disaggregate level, Aitken and Harrison
(1999) ¯nd no evidence of positive spillovers from foreign to local Venezuelan ¯rms.
Kokko and others (1996) study Uruguayan manufacturing plants to explore the
hypothesis of technology spillovers. They ¯nd a positive spillover e®ect only in
the sub-sample of locally-owned plants with moderate technological gap vis-a-vis
foreign ¯rms. The validity of their results, however, su®ers from critics of exogenous
sample-splitting and the omitted variable bias such as the host country's absorptive
capacity. Kinoshita (2002) includes R&D expenditure as a proxy for absorptive
capacity in the study of Czech manufacturing ¯rms and ¯nds that the degree of
spillover from FDI is positively related to the host country's R&D expenditure.
In cross-country studies, Borensztein and others (1998) ¯nd that the incidence
of technology spillover via FDI hinges on the level of human capital. Without
educated workforce, however, FDI has no e®ect on economic growth. Their study
is one of the ¯rst studies to take into account the role of absorptive capacity. Other
authors refer to, among other things, ¯nancial development, trade openness, and
institutional quality as absorptive capacity. Alfaro and others (2004) condition the
e®ect of FDI on growth on the development of ¯nancial markets and found that
FDI has accelerated growth for a group of countries with more developed ¯nancial
markets. Balasubramanyam and others (1996) and Kohpaiboon (2002) argue that
trade openness is crucial for a positive growth e®ect of FDI. More recently, Durham
4(2004) examines institutional and ¯nancial development6 as absorptive capacity
that determines the degree of technology spillovers. All these recent studies explore
the role of absorptive capacity but do not explicitly take into account a technology
gap as in Findlay. On the other hand, Girma (2005) muddles with the concepts
of technology gap and absorptive capacity and concludes that technology transfer
occurs if the host country's "absorptive capacity" is moderate. However, what she
calls absorptive capacity is close to the notion of technology gap, or the catch-up
e®ect.
In this study, we distinguish two concepts, absorptive capacity and technology
gap. Absorptive capacity is the ability necessary for the host country to absorb and
adopt new incoming technology from a foreign country. Technology gap is a distance
between the host and source countries' technology levels, which is exogenously given.
Our model is thus an extension of Findlay's by further endogenizing the role of
absorptive capacity in determining the degree of technology spillovers.
More explicitly, the host country's absorptive capacity is proxied by infrastruc-
ture in the model. There are two channels via which infrastructure could a®ect
growth. First, it is well-known that infrastructure is one of the important determi-
nants of economic growth7 in various cross-country studies as infrastructure exerts
positive externalities economy-wide (e.g. the more telephone mainlines increase ef-
¯ciency of communication). Second, foreign investors are likely to be attracted to a
country with su±cient provisions of infrastructure which reduces the cost of doing
business as many empirical studies corroborate (Wheeler and Mody 1992; Kumar
2001; Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). In other words, infrastructure a®ects growth
not only via a direct channel but also via an indirect channel through FDI. This sec-
ond e®ect can be non-negligible as it has a compounding e®ect: infrastructure ¯rst
increases the e±ciency of FDI and FDI together with high quality infrastructure af-
fects growth positively. Therefore, infrastructure is akin to the notion of absorptive
6The variables used for absorptive capacity are stock market capitalization, business regulation, prop-
erty rights, and corruption indexes.
7Aschauer,1989; Munnel, 1990; Easterley and Rebelo, 1993; Hulten, Gramlich, 1994; Peteira and
Flores de Frutos, 1999; Canning and Pedroni, 1999; Bougheas et al, 1999.
5capacity. There are also other possible factors that could explain the absorptive
capacity. In the empirical section, we will test other variables that could proxy the
absorptive capacity to see if infrastructure is indeed an appropriate measure of the
absorptive capacity.
3 The Model
We develop an overlapping generations model to explain the structure of the host
economy. There are two types of individuals in each period, young and old. Each
individual lives for two periods. Suppose that Lt individuals are born in period t,
and population grows at rate n; thus Lt = (1 + n)Lt¡1 = (1 + n)t given that L0
is normalized to unity. Since individuals live for two period, at time t, there are
Lt = (1 + n)t people in their ¯rst period of lives and (1 + n)t¡1 individuals in their
second period of lives.
Let c1t and c2t be the consumption in period t of young and old individuals; the
utility of an individual born at t, denoted by Ut, is de¯ned as:
Ut = lnc1t + ¯ lnc2t+1; (1)
where ¯ > 0 re°ects the individual's subject time preference rate; if ¯ < 1, individual
puts greater weight on ¯rst-period than second-period consumption; if ¯ > 1, the
situation is reverse.
When young, an individual works and earns labor income. She saves a fraction
of income for the consumption when old. Also, the young also pays taxes, which
¯nances public investment in infrastructure. Suppose young individual supplies one
unit of labor inelastically and earns wage w1t, which is determined endogenously as
will be more clear later. The individual pays income tax at a ¯xed rate denoted by
¿ and then divides the dispensable labor income into ¯rst-period consumption and
savings; hen the individual gets old, he or she simply consumes the savings and any
interests earned. The lifetime budget constraint faces each individual is
c1t +
c2t+1
1 + rt
= (1 ¡ ¿)w1t: (2)
6The left-hand side of (2) denotes the present value of lifetime consumption which
should equal to the present value of lifetime income, shown in the right-hand side
of (2). The optimal consumption path (c1t;c2t+1), solved by maximizing (1) subject
to (2), is shown in terms of wage, tax rate, interest rate, and time preference rate
as:
c1t =
(1 ¡ ¿)w1t
1 + ¯
(3)
c2t+1 =
¯(1 + r)(1 ¡ ¿)w1t
1 + ¯
(4)
Income tax revenues are used to ¯nance the expense of infrastructure. In each
period, the government runs a balanced budget: collects taxes and spends all tax
revenue to invest in infrastructure. Therefore the infrastructure per active labor is
st = ¿w1t:
Production
In the production function, there are two factors of production: capital and labor.
Labor (Lt) is supplied entirely by domestic residents (the young). For simplicity,
capital (Kt) is entirely provided by foreign investors. In each period, capital depre-
ciates completely. Foreign capital °ows in till the net marginal product of capital
(marginal product of capital minus depreciation rate) equals to the world interest
rate rW.
Let production technology is represented by the Cobb-Douglas function and
is denoted by Yt = AtF(Kt;Lt) = AtK®
t L1¡®
t , where At denotes the technology
parameter. We assume that domestic technology progress is driven by the potential
technology spillover from foreign direct investment. Speci¯cally, we let
At+1 = At + (AW
t ¡ At)Á(kt)h(st); (5)
where AW
t denotes the foreign technology (the world's technology frontier), which
is embodied in foreign capital, and is assumed to grow at a constant exogenous rate
g; (AW
t ¡ At) denotes the technology gap between the home and foreign countries
7(similar to the concept of the relative backwardness in Findlay 1977); Á(kt) measures
the e®ective exposure to foreign capital, where kt ´
Kt¡1
Lt¡1 is the ration of foreign
capital to domestic labor. Speci¯cally, let
Á(kt) = 1 ¡
1
expfktg
; (6)
where Á(0) = 0, Á(1) = 1, Á0() > 0, and Á00() < 0, which implies that the presence
of foreign capital is the necessary condition for spill over, and extent of technology
leakage is increasing in the kt, but the marginal rate of technology spill over is
diminishing. Finally, h(st) is de¯ned as
h(st) =
8
<
:
0; if st < s
1 ¡ 1
expfst¡sg; if st ¸ s
; (7)
where s denotes the minimum level of infrastructure that the home country needs
to acquire, so that the e®ect of "spillover" starts kicking in. We normalize AW
0
to unity; hence AW
t = (1 + g)AW
t¡1 = (1 + g)t, and domestic technology progress
equation becomes:
At+1 =
8
<
:
At if st < s
At + ((1 + g)t ¡ At)
³
1 ¡ 1
expfktg
´³
1 ¡ 1
expfst¡sg
´
otherwise
(8)
Notice that the technology parameter At is a state variable and is endogenously
determined in previous period. The return rate of capital provided in the world
market, denoted by rW, for simplicity, is exogenously given and is assumed to be
constant over time.
Equilibrium Conditions
Markets are assumed to be competitive, labor and capital thus earn their marginal
products, and ¯rms earn zero pro¯ts. In each period, in the absence of investment
frictions (such as taxes or subsidies), foreign capital °ows in until the marginal prod-
uct of capital equals to rW+1. In turn, other endogenous variables fkt;wt;st;c1t;c2t+1g
8can be solved as:
kt ´
Kt
Lt
= A
1
1¡®
t
µ
®
1 + rW
¶ 1
1¡®
(9)
wt = (1 ¡ ®)A
1
1¡®
t
µ
®
1 + rW
¶ ®
1¡®
(10)
st = ¿(1 ¡ ®)A
1
1¡®
t
µ
®
1 + rW
¶ ®
1¡®
(11)
c1t =
(1 ¡ ¿)(1 ¡ ®)A
1
1¡®
t
³
®
1+rW
´ ®
1¡®
1 + ¯
(12)
c2t+1 =
¯(1 + rW)(1 ¡ ¿)(1 ¡ ®)A
1
1¡®
t
³
®
1+rW
´ ®
1¡®
1 + ¯
(13)
Then plugging the solved kt and st into (8), we can solve At+1, which then deter-
mine fkt+1;wt+1;st+1;c1t+1;c2t+2g. Therefore, given any country's initial condition
regarding fA0;rW;®;s;g;ng, by iteration, we can solve the transition path from
the initial status to steady state of the economy.
We emphasis the role of absorptive capacity in determining the extent of tech-
nology spillover through FDI, which consequently a®ects the host country's growth.
The following equation explicitly shows the linkage:
Yt = Atk®
t Lt = A
2¡®
1¡®
t
µ
®
1 + rW
¶ 1
1¡®
(1 + n)t:
Taking logarithm on both sides, we have:
lnYt =
µ
2 ¡ ®
1 ¡ ®
¶
lnAt +
1
1 ¡ ®
ln
µ
®
1 + rW
¶
+ tln(1 + n) (14)
ln
Yt+1
Yt
=
µ
2 ¡ ®
1 ¡ ®
¶
ln
At+1
At
+ ln(1 + n)
'
µ
2 ¡ ®
1 ¡ ®
¶µ
AW
t ¡ At
At
¶
£
µ
1 ¡
1
expfktg
¶
£
µ
1 ¡
1
expfst ¡ sg
¶
£ I(st ¸ s)
+ln(1 + n)
94 Simulations
We demonstrate here that the extent to which an FDI host country can catch up to
the world frontier technology embodied in FDI crucially depends on the country's
infrastructure. For simplicity, we assume that infrastructure is ¯nanced by income
tax collected by the government. We choose exogenous parameters f rW = 0:06,
® = 0:3, s = 0:01, g = 0:05, n = 0:01,¯ = 0:5g and initial values for the state
variables f A0 = 0:9, AW
0 = 1, L0 = 1 g.
Under di®erent tax policies f¿ = 0:01, ¿ = 0:03, ¿ = 0:05g, we study the
evolution path of a country's labor income, consumption, foreign capital in°ow,
infrastructure, and technology gap as presented in Figure 2. It is shown that when
the tax rate is low, ¿ = 0:01, the host country's initial infrastructure is below the
threshold (s0 = 0:0035 < s = 0:01). Although some advanced foreign technology is
introduced into a host country due to the relative high return to capital, a spillover
e®ect is inhibited since the host country processes insu±cient absorptive capacity.
The country thus stagnates as its technology remains at the initial level and the
technological gap with the world is widening over time. As a result, per capita
consumption of the old as well as the young, output, and foreign capital per worker
remain constant.
When the tax rates are su±ciently high, ¿ = 0:03, or ¿ = 0:05, the host coun-
try's initial infrastructure level, which are 0.010 and 0.017 respectively, exceeds the
threshold. As foreign capital °ows in, and the e®ect of technology spillovers kick in,
and the country's growth starts to take o®. The country may initially attract only
a small amount of foreign capital due to its low technology level. As the country
climbs up the technological ladder, however, it enhances its attractiveness to foreign
capital and an increase in national income further improves the infrastructure level.
As technology spillovers interacted with the absorptive capacity are ampli¯ed, the
speed of a catch-up accelerates, increases the return to FDI and attracts more for-
eign capital in°ows. Eventually, the technology gap between the host country and
the world closes up. The country with¿ = 0:05 converges to the frontier technology
faster than the country with ¿ = 0:03 but at the expense of a lower consumption
10level in the early time.8 In steady state, per capita output grows at the same rate
as the world technology grows.
5 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model presented in the previous section shows that the absorptive
capacity is crucial in explaining the e®ect of FDI on economic growth. In this
section, we test this hypothesis by using panel data from 42 developing countries
for the periods of 30 years.
5.1 Data
The data used in this study comprise a panel of 42 non-OECD countries9 for the
period of 30 years that covers 1971 and 2000. The growth rate of income, initial
income and government consumption are drawn from Penn World Table 6.1. School-
ing is measured as average years of secondary schooling in the working population
from the Barro and Lee dataset. Population growth and black market premium are
taken from the World Development Indicators. Infrastructure variables (telephone
lines, roads, and energy consumption) are drawn from the infrastructure data set
constructed by Calderon and Serven, available on the World Bank website. The
FDI variable refers to gross FDI in°ows drawn from IMF 's International Financial
Statistics. In the regression, the presence of foreign knowledge in the country is
captured by a ratio of FDI in°ows to GDP. The existing empirical literature on eco-
nomic growth uses the cross-sectional framework by taking the average of a certain
time span (e.g. ¯ve years, ten years, or longer) in order to smooth out the business
cycle parts of the series [Barro, 1991]. Following the existing studies, we construct
a panel data set with data averaged over each of the six 5-year periods between
8It is plausible that there exists an optimal taxation path that maximizes the aggregate utilities of the
in¯nite number of generations. The further study is required to see how di®erent the taxation schedule
may be from our model when individuals are allowed to choose between labor and leisure, or when the
infrastructure is ¯nanced by tax on foreign capital.
9It includes emerging and developing countries but does not include transition countries. See the list
of the countries in Appendix.
111971 and 2000. The use of the 5 year-period panel data has an advantage over the
30-year cross sectional data as it provides us with greater number of observations
and allows us to control for heterogeneity across countries.
5.2 Methodology
Combining equations (8) and (10), our empirical speci¯cation in a reduced form is
as follows:
ln(
Yit
Yit¡1
) = ¯1 lnYi0 + ¯2FDIit + ¯3ABit + ¯4FDIit £ ABit £ Catchupit + ¯5nit + ¯6Xit + uit(15)
where Yi0 is initial income level, FDIit is a ratio of gross FDI in°ows to GDP, ABit
is a proxy for absorptive capacity (i.e. infrastructure), Catchupit is a gap between
output in the leading country and that of country i, nit is a population growth, and
Xit is a set of other variables that a®ect growth rates.
5.3 Estimation Results
We attempt to re-examine the e®ect of FDI on growth based on our theoretical
model. First, we see whether or not FDI has a positive e®ect without conditioning
on the absorptive capacity. Second, we will see if FDI interacts with the absorptive
capacity to a®ect growth.
Table 1 presents the base regression results for developing countries. All re-
gressions include the conventional growth determinants such as the initial level of
income, government consumption, population growth, black market premiums fol-
lowing the neoclassical growth studies. The variables of our interest are FDI and
the interaction terms with FDI and infrastructure. In addition to FDI and infras-
tructure, we also include the schooling or human capital variable. It is generally
accepted in the literature that human capital is one of the most important deter-
mining factors for economic growth. At the same time, human capital could also
re°ect a FDI- recipient country's absorptive capacity as argued by Borensztein,
DeGregorio, and Lee (1998).
Table 1 shows that FDI does not exert a positive impact on growth as shown in
12a negative but statistically insigni¯cant coe±cient of FDI in most columns. In the
OLS regressions, initial income and average years of schooling enter signi¯cantly
with expected signs. Turning to human capital-related variables, the interaction
term between FDI and schooling enter negatively in contrast to the ¯nding by
Borenstein and others (1998). This suggests that the e®ect of FDI on growth is
not necessarily conditional on educational attainment. On the other hand, the
coe±cient of the interaction term between FDI and infrastructure is positive and
signi¯cant. This implies that FDI a®ects growth rate positively only when there
is already su±cient infrastructure in place in the recipient country. Furthermore,
infrastructure itself exerts a positive e®ect on economic growth by lesser magnitude
than human capital.
Columns 3 through 6 show the panel regression results. The ¯ndings in the
OLS regressions appear to be preserved in the panel regressions. Random e®ects
GLS estimates are quite similar to those in the OLS in size and magnitude. As
we move to the ¯xed e®ects "within" estimators, the coe±cients become somewhat
fragile. Namely, the negative e®ect of FDI is greater and statistically signi¯cant.
However, the Hausman test cannot reject the random-e®ect model (column 3) over
the ¯xed-e®ect model (column 4). So we will interpret the within estimators with
caution.
For comparison, we also present the between estimator and a normal maximum
likelihood estimator in the table. The between estimator is equivalent to a cross-
sectional regression over 30 years. Interestingly, the long-run e®ect of FDI is positive
but not statistically signi¯cant. Nevertheless, the compounding e®ect of FDI and
infrastructure is present and three times as much as in the panel with a shorter
interval.
To sum up, we ¯nd that FDI alone fails to a®ect economic growth as found in
other previous studies. We also ¯nd that the positive e®ect of FDI is realized in the
country only when there is su±cient infrastructure. This result is robust even after
controlling for a possible interactive e®ect between FDI and schooling.
Table 2 presents our robustness checks. In Table 2 we check whether or not our
choice of infrastructure variable a®ects our results. We substitute the number of
telephone main lines per 1000 workers used in the base regressions with a number
13of measures available in the dataset for the infrastructure variable. There are two
alternative infrastructure variables in Calderon and Serven: power generation ca-
pacity (GW per 1000 workers) and total roads length in km per sq. of surface area.
We also constructed the composite infrastructure index "principle component" from
all three variables by principle component methods. We ¯nd that two of the three
yield a positive coe±cient on the interaction term between FDI and infrastructure.
The sign is opposite when we use total roads length, although it is statistically in-
signi¯cant. This may be due to measurement errors in the road variable. The road
variable is also least correlated with the composite infrastructure index.
In Table 3, we check whether our results are sensitive to the omission of other
variables that could measure absorptive capacity such as trade openness, quality
of institutions, and ¯nancial market development. The regressions are based on
random-e®ects GLS. We ¯nd that our results are robust to the inclusion of other
variables. It is generally accepted that trade openness is a crucial factor in ac-
celerating economic growth as seen in the Asian tigers. At the same time, it is
often argued that FDI and trade are complements particularly when FDI is export-
promoting. We add trade openness measured as the sum of exports and imports as
a share of GDP and the interaction of FDI and openness. The inclusion of these
variables in column 1 does not a®ect the base results of a positive and signi¯cant
coe±cient of FDI ¤infrastructure. In columns 2-4, we add the institutional qual-
ity variables: rule of law, corruption, and quality of bureaucracy that are drawn
from ICRG. Again, the interaction term between FDI and infrastructure remain
positive and signi¯cant. This ¯nding contrasts those by Durham (2004). Using a
di®erent dataset that cover both developed and developing countries, Durham ¯nds
that the e®ect of equity foreign direct investment has a positive e®ect conditional
on the institutional quality such as property rights and regulation indices. Once we
include infrastructure in the panel data setting, we ¯nd a di®erent result. Finally, in
columns 5-7, we include the ¯nancial market development indicators: liquidity lia-
bilities as a share of GDP, private credit by deposit money banks and other ¯nancial
institutions as a share of GDP, stock market capitalization as a share of GDP. They
are drawn from the World Bank's Structure Data. Our results on FDI and infras-
tructure remain robust through di®erent speci¯cations. As Alfaro and others (2004)
14argue, well-developed ¯nancial markets could lead to signi¯cant gains from FDI as
also found in the positive coe±cients of some of the interaction terms between FDI
and liquidity liabilities/stock market capitalization in our results. However, they
fail to bear statistical signi¯cance.
In Tables1-3, we show that there is a positive interactive e®ect between FDI and
infrastructure. This is also because FDI is likely to be drawn to a country with
su±cient infrastructure to start with. In Table 4, we introduce the catch-up term
to see if the results still hold. The catch-up term for country i is de¯ned as Ymax
Yi ,
the ratio of output level of the leading country's to that of country i's. The greater
the catch-up term is, the more room for country i to adopt the existing technology
already produced in the country on the technology frontier. If the so-called catch-
up e®ect is indeed present, then the laggard country would bene¯t from exogenous
technology spillovers from the leader for simply being behind on the technology level
and the technology gap will automatically disappear over time. In that case, we
would expect the catch-up term to have a positive impact on growth. This is also
closely related to the concept of convergence to the leading country.
We include in column 1 the interaction term of FDI and catch-up to see if FDI
facilitates the adoption and implementation of new technology from the leading
country. For developing countries, this variable shows more explicitly whether or
not the presence of foreign investment in a country magni¯es the catch-up e®ect
from technology di®usion from abroad. The answer is no. The interaction term of
FDI and catch-up enters negatively but insigni¯cantly, indicating that FDI does not
necessarily facilitate the process of catch-up.
Column 2 shows that the catch-up e®ect via FDI reappears once we control
for the level of infrastructure as shown in the positive coe±cient of the interaction
between FDI, catch-up and infrastructure. This implies that technology spillovers
from FDI for laggard countries are only present when a country has su±cient infras-
tructure. This result is robust to the inclusions of other variables (Columns 3 and
4). Note that there also exists a pure catch-up e®ect, or convergence to the leading
country as indicated in a positive coe±cient of Ymax
Yi . This is further strengthened in
presence of infrastructure and FDI. Tables 1-3 presented that FDI and infrastruc-
ture together have a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on growth. Table 4 con¯rms that
15such a compounding e®ect of FDI and infrastructure takes a particular channel of
technology di®usion as shown in the interaction term with the catch-up term.
5.4 Endogeneity
One important concern in assessing the e®ect of FDI on growth is the possibility
of endogeneity and reverse causality of FDI. If a fast growing economy requires
more FDI, then FDI and growth are simultaneously determined and FDI would
be correlated with an error term. Alternatively, there may be omitted variable
bias as we are using a reduced-form estimation applied to developing countries.
If omitted variables are observable and readily available, we can include them as
additional regressors. However, if omitted variables are unobservable, we will end
up with a biased estimate for the coe±cient of FDI. Thus, we will need to construct
instruments for FDI.
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of generalized two-stage least square (G2SLS)
and error-component two-stage least square (EC2SLS), respectively.10 Instrumental
variables for FDI are one-year lagged FDI, corruption, bureaucracy, law, and log
of population. The F-test for the joint signi¯cance of the instruments in all cases
is above 10, suggesting that there is no weak instruments problem. The Hausman
test shows that the coe±cients in the Within 2SLS (W2SLS) and EC2SLS are not
systematically di®erent. Thus, we do not report the results from W2SLS here.
Comparing Column 3 in Table 1, the results of the instrumental variable esti-
mation in Table 5 are similar results to those obtained by GLS. The coe±cients on
FDI and other interaction terms with FDI show a similar pattern, though they are
somewhat exaggerated in Table 5. In particular, the interaction term between FDI
and infrastructure is 5.05 which is three times as large as that in GLS (Column 2,
Table 5). The IV estimation also indicates that FDI and infrastructure are com-
plementary in a®ecting growth as before. Similarly, the IV estimation in Table 6
clearly yield the similar pattern to the results in Table 4. The catch-up e®ect is
present as shown in the positive coe±cient on Ymax
Yi . However, a negative coe±cient
10G2SLS and EC2SLS yield the same asymptotic variance-covariance matrix (Baltagi and Lin, 1992).
See Chapter 7 in Baltagi (2005) for more detail.
16of FDI interacted with the catch-up term shows that the process of catch-up is not
necessarily accelerated by the presence of foreign knowledge in the country. Rather,
the positive catch-up e®ect kicks in only when the country has su±cient absorptive
capacity (e.g. infrastructure) and receives FDI, as shown in the positive coe±cient
of the interaction term among FDI, infrastructure, and the catch-up term.
6 Conclusions
This paper has studied the importance of absorptive capacity in determining the
e®ect of FDI on economic growth. We highlight the role of infrastructure as one of
the most important conduits or constraints for enhancing the e±ciency of FDI. In
the overlapping generation model, we show that the degree of technology spillovers
is determined by FDI in°ows to the host country and a technology gap from the
leading country, conditional on the country's infrastructure level. If it falls short
of a threshold, the country stagnates even when there are some FDI in°ows and a
room for technology catch-up. On the other hand, if the country's infrastructure is
su±ciently high, the country will bene¯t spillovers from FDI and attain the higher
level of growth.
Our paper contributes to the FDI-growth literature by con¯rming that FDI is
indeed an important channel of international technology di®usion once we take into
account the host country's absorptive capacity. We also distinguished three factors
that in°uence the degree of technology spillovers { relative backwardness (initial
technology gap), FDI intensity, and absorptive capacity in the empirical analysis to
a±rm the complementarity among these factors. More importantly, the main ¯nding
of this paper suggests that FDI alone is not a panacea for economic development;
the host country should undertake infrastructure investment prior to attracting FDI
in order to maximize the incidence of technology spillovers from FDI.
The ¯nding leads to the policy implication that infrastructure development
should be an integral part of growth strategy especially when a country is opening
up for foreign investment. In developing countries, public investment can provide
physical infrastructure prior to attracting FDI.
Despite further infrastructure needs, the share of infrastructure investment ¯-
17nanced by the public sector has been on a declining trend during the last three
decades in a number of developing countries.11 In the countries that face tight ¯scal
de¯cit limits because of ¯scal adjustments or institutional constraints,12 the increas-
ing involvement of the private sector is needed in building physical infrastructure.
Other alternative to public investment is public-private partnerships (PPPs). At-
tracting FDI in the key infrastructure sectors such as telecommunication, energy,
and transport could also substitute public ¯nancing to support increased infrastruc-
ture investment without adding to direct government borrowing and help create a
vicious cycle of foreign investment in°ows in other sectors.
11See the IMF board paper on Public Investment and Fiscal Policy (SM/04/93) for more detail.
12For example, the member countries of the EU under the Stability and Growth Pact cannot borrow
to ¯nance additional public investment beyond the limit.
18Appendix
List of the Countries
Bangladesh BGD Israel ISR Senegal SEN
Bolivia BOL Jamaica JAM Singapore SGP
Brazil BRA Jordan JOR Sierra Leone SLE
Chile CHL Kenya KEN El Salvador SLV
China CHN Korea KOR Thailand THA
Columbia COL Sri Lanka LKA Tunisia TUN
Costa Rica CRI Mexico MEX Turkey TUR
Egypt EGY Mali MLI Mauritius MUS
Ghana GHA Malaysia MYS Uganda UGA
Guatemala GTM Nicaragua NIC Uruguay URY
Honduras HND Pakistan PAK Venezuela VEN
Indonesia IDN Panama PAN South Africa ZAF
India IND Peru PER Paraguay PRY
Iran IRN Rwanda RWA Zambia ZMB
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26Table 1. FDI, Absorptive Capacity, and Growth ( 5-year panel of 1971-2000) 
 
  (1)OLS  (2)OLS (3)GLS (4)Within  (5)Between (6)MLE
    
Log(GDP0) -0.126  -0.179 -0.179 -0.124  -0.179
  (4.61)**  (6.12)** (5.26)** (2.43)*  (5.29)**
Pop growth -0.009  -0.006 0.003 0.000 -0.044  0.004
  (0.59)  (0.40) (0.19) (0.01) (1.41)  (0.28)
Schooling 0.117  0.109 0.093 -0.134 0.275  0.089
  (2.72)**  (2.66)** (2.19)* (1.92) (3.17)**  (2.08)*
Gov’t consumption -0.002  -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 0.002  -0.003
  (1.50)  (2.03)* (1.80) (2.48)* (0.68)  (1.86)
Log (blkmrkt) -0.010  -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.012 -0.010
  (1.44)  (1.34) (1.39) (0.98) (0.78)  (1.45)
FDI -1.961  -0.864 -2.115 -7.951 0.633  -2.400
  (1.16)  (0.53) (1.17) (3.25)** (0.19)  (1.28)
FDI*Schooling -4.990 -4.179 -3.295 2.771 -16.398  -3.094
  (2.26)*  (1.99)* (1.62) (1.20) (3.11)**  (1.55)
Infra 0.011  0.048 0.049 0.024 -0.026  0.049
  (0.49)  (2.08)* (1.92) (0.64) (0.53)  (1.97)*
FDI*Infra 1.912  1.517 1.631 1.314 4.127  1.651
  (2.80)**  (2.33)* (2.45)* (1.54) (2.64)*  (2.57)*
Period dummies    No Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 170  170 170 170 42  170
R-squared 0.28  0.37 0.19 0.65 
Number of CS    42 42 42  42
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is average real per capita GDP growth over each five-year period. All 
regressions include a constant term. Parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** denote 5% and 1% level 
significance, respectively.    
 
27Table 2. FDI, growth and alternative infrastructure variables (5-year panel of 1971-2000) 
 Power  generation Roads Principle 
Ln(GDP0) -0.092 -0.073 -0.121
  (2.78)** (3.31)** (3.80)** 
Population growth -0.003 -0.001 0.005
  (0.21) (0.04) (0.35)
Schooling 0.101 0.065 0.067
  (2.38)* (1.78) (1.47)
Gov’t consumption -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (1.14) (1.28) (1.36)
Ln(1+blkmrkt) -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 
  (2.01)* (1.99)* (1.88)
FDI 3.101 -0.864 1.680
  (1.20) (0.46) (0.74)
FDI*schooling -1.330 0.825 -0.620 
  (0.67) (0.55) (0.31)
Infrastructure -0.002 0.030 0.040
  (0.06) (1.48) (1.19)
FDI*infrastructure 1.051 -0.457 0.864
  (1.41) (0.78) (0.95)
Period dummies  Yes Yes Yes
  
Observations 170 170 170
Number of CS  42 42 42
 
Notes:  
The dependent variable is average real per capita GDP growth over each five-year period. All 
regressions presented here are generalized least square. All include a constant term. Parentheses are 
t-statistics. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
28Table 3. FDI, growth and other absorptive capacities (5-year panel for 1971-2000) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)
Ln(GDP0) -0.182 -0.187 -0.176 -0.174 -0.213 -0.218 -0.195
  (5.51)**  (5.16)** (4.96)** (4.88)** (5.38)** (5.66)**  (4.97)**
Population growth 0.004  -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 0.006 0.005  0.004
  (0.25)  (0.81) (0.77) (0.85) (0.40) (0.34)  (0.28)
Schooling  0.114 0.093 0.110 0.093 0.084 0.091 0.097
  (2.54)*  (2.13)* (2.50)* (2.15)* (1.84) (2.03)*  (1.98)*
Gov’t consumption -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
  (1.60)  (1.82) (1.29) (1.95) (1.53) (1.73)  (0.86)
Ln(1+blkmrkt) -0.012  -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.007 -0.011 -0.004
  (1.71)  (1.79) (1.63) (1.55) (0.91) (1.54)  (0.42)
FDI -1.335  -0.961 -0.651 -2.525 -2.683 -1.530  2.218
  (0.73)  (0.34) (0.29) (1.22) (1.31) (0.76)  (0.92)
FDI*schooling -4.315  -4.400 -4.884 -4.618 -3.017 -3.470 -4.452
  (2.03)*  (2.11)* (2.36)* (2.25)* (1.40) (1.66)  (1.94)
Infrastructure  0.044 0.043 0.033 0.041 0.068 0.064 0.061
  (1.76)  (1.58) (1.18) (1.53) (2.41)* (2.33)*  (2.03)*
FDI*infrastructure  2.043 2.338 2.635 1.793 1.713 2.119 1.106
  (2.70)**  (2.91)** (3.22)** (2.33)* (1.98)* (2.67)**  (1.23)
Openness -0.000     
  (0.43)    
FDI*openness -0.019     
  (0.83)    
Rule of Law    0.006    
   (0.67)   
FDI*Rule of Law    -0.628    
   (0.65)   
Corruption   0.007    
   (0.93)   
FDI*Corruption   -1.031   
   (1.42)   
Bureaucracy   -0.006    
   (0.44)   
FDI*Bureaucracy   1.314    
   (1.35)   
Liquidity   -0.105    
   (1.28)   
FDI*liquidity   2.717    
   (0.73)   
Private credit   -0.007   
   (0.10)  
FDI*private credit   -2.685   
   (0.69)  
Stock mrkt cap.     0.030
     (0.63)
FDI*stock mrkt cap     3.218
     (0.90)
Observations  170 163 163 163 152 157 114
Number  of  cs  42 40 40 40 41 42 35
 
29Table 4 FDI, Absorptive capacity, catch-up effect and growth (5-year panel) 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
       
Population growth  -0.003  0.003  0.001  0.002 
  (0.19)  (0.21) (0.10) (0.14) 
Schooling 0.026  0.037  0.086  0.090 
 (0.57)  (0.94)  (2.09)*  (2.33)* 
Gov’t consumption  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003 
 (1.13)  (1.57)  (1.62)  (2.14)* 
Ln(1+ blakmrkt)  -0.012  -0.008  -0.008  -0.009 
  (1.63)  (1.02) (1.06) (1.30) 
FDI -0.895  -5.538  -2.999  0.369 
 (0.40)  (2.80)**  (1.41)  (0.16) 
FDI*schooling 1.392  0.862 -1.636  -2.441 
  (0.83)  (0.59) (0.97) (1.47) 
Infrastructure   -0.004  0.005  -0.018  0.021 
  (0.25)  (0.33) (1.15) (1.01) 
FDI*(Ymax/Y) -0.021    -0.314 -0.396 
 (0.18)    (2.57)*  (3.27)** 
FDI*(Ymax/Y)* 
infrastructure  
 0.230 
(3.81)** 
0.335 
(4.79)** 
0.261 
(3.62)** 
Ymax/Y         0.011 
       (2.75)** 
Period  dummies  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  170  170 170 170 
Number of id  42  42  42  42 
 
Notes:  
The dependent variable is average real per capita GDP growth over each five-year period. All regressions 
presented here are generalized least square. All include a constant term. Parentheses are t-statistics. * and ** 
denote 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
30Table 5. FDI, absorptive capacity, and growth (5-year panel)  
 
 (1)G2SLS  (2)EC2SLS 
    
Log(GDP0) -0.103  -0.154 
 (1.15)  (4.27)** 
Pop growth  0.007  -0.025 
 (0.11)  (1.23) 
Schooling 0.355  0.217 
 (1.06)  (2.81)** 
Gov’t consumption  -0.004  -0.003 
 (1.28)  (2.06)* 
Log (blkmrkt)  -0.012  -0.009 
 (0.80)  (1.26) 
FDI -3.464  -7.983 
 (1.43)  (1.52) 
FDI*schooling -16.715  -11.242 
 (0.81)  (2.51)* 
Infrastructure -0.236  -0.032 
 (1.15)  (0.67) 
FDI*Infrastructure 1.877  5.050 
 (1.56)  (2.67)** 
Period dummies   Yes  Yes 
Observations 157  157 
Number of CS  39  39 
 
Notes:  
The dependent variable is average real per capita GDP growth over each five-year period. G2SLS is generalized 
two-stage least square and EC2SLS is error-component two-stage least square. All include a constant term. 
Parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance, respectively. Instruments variables used 
for FDI are lagged FDI, corruption, bureaucracy, law, and log of population. 
 
 
31Table 6. FDI, absorptive capacity, catch-up and growth (5-year panel)  
 
 (1)G2SLS  (2)EC2SLS 
    
Pop growth  -0.002  -0.014 
 (0.04)  (0.64) 
Schooling 0.156  0.181 
 (0.72)  (2.73)** 
Gov’t consumption  -0.006  -0.005 
 (2.57)*  (3.22)** 
Log(blkmrkt) -0.010  -0.010 
 (0.89)  (1.20) 
FDI 13.967  13.778 
 (1.02)  (2.84)** 
FDI*schooling -8.089 -9.680 
 (0.54)  (2.31)* 
Infrastructure   0.026  0.021 
 (0.77)  (1.00) 
FDI*(Ymax/Y) -1.668  -1.374 
 (2.81)**  (4.94)** 
FDI*(Ymax/Y)* 0.371  0.354 
Infrastructure   (1.12)  (2.34)* 
Ymax/Y 0.037  0.031 
 (3.45)**  (4.00)** 
Period dummies   Yes  Yes 
Observations 157 157 
Number of CS  39  39 
 
Notes:  
The dependent variable is average real per capita GDP growth over each five-year period. G2SLS is generalized 
two-stage least square and EC2SLS is error-component two-stage least square. All include a constant term. 
Parentheses are z-statistics. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance, respectively. Instruments variables used 
for FDI are lagged FDI, corruption, bureaucracy, law, and log of population. 
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